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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
the court found the certificate to be a thing of value even if de-
ferred in realization, acquired during the-marriage and hence,
community property.
The community is dissolved as of the date of judgment for
separation - not of the filing of the suit. Thus, the husband
owes the community all cash dividends received by him until the
date of judgment. Alimony pendente lite is grounded on the
husband's legal duty to support his wife, regardless of fault on
her part and is payable out of community funds. After dissolu-
tion of the community, the husband does not owe his wife ali-
mony unless the court awards it, which was not the case here.
Thus, alimony paid after judgment by the husband must be
charged against the wife's share in the community. The com-
mingling rule was applied against the husband's demands for
credit to his separate estate. The law allows the wife an in-
junction to protect her share of community and she may not be
penalized for using it. Interest was allowed on the debt to the
wife without need to amend pleadings.
CONVENTIONAL OBLIGATIONS
J. Denson Smith*
A contention that Civil Code Article 167 is out of harmony
with modern conditions and should be held repealed by implica-
tion was rejected in Lowther v. Fireside Mutual Life Insurance
Co.' The court concluded, contrary to the contention of plaintiff,
that the prohibition against a major's binding himself for a
longer term than five years is still in full force and effect. It
therefore affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's suit to recover on
an employment contract beyond the allowable period.
A contract between the Louisiana Department of Highways
and a road contractor was held to contain a stipulation pour
autrui in favor of an abutting landowner in Ortego, v. Caldwell.2
In consequence, the landowner, whose levees were to be rebuilt
to his satisfaction, was given judgment against the contractor
for damages resulting from the contractor's failure properly to
fulfill his obligation. That the stipulation for the rebuilding of
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 228 La. 946, 84 So.2d 596 (1955).
2. 229 La. 907, 87 So.2d 124 (1956).
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the levees was for the benefit of the adjoining landowners seems
entirely clear on the basis of the wording of the contract and the
circumstances of the case.
Another problem of contract interpretation was involved in
Guerriero v. Davidson.8 The plaintiff attorney's contention that
a yearly retainer fee agreement with defendant used-car dealer
did not cover legal services of a personal nature was sustained.
The lower court's award was reduced on the proper ground that
the plaintiff was precluded from recovering more than the
amount of the bill he had presented to the defendant for the serv-
ices rendered.
In Zenith Construction Co. v. Southern Construction Cor-
poration4 an assignee who had assumed responsibility for com-
pleting a sewer contract was endeavoring to recover from the
assignor the cost of making certain repairs allegedly necessitated
by the negligence of the assignor. The court found it unneces-
sary to pass on the question of whether the assignor was respon-
sible for the making of the repairs inasmuch as the assignee had
failed to prove the alleged negligence.
That the cost of making necessary repairs plus other losses
resulting directly from defects of construction is the proper
measure of recovery, whether the contract is a construction con-
tract or the sale of a completed house, may be inferred from
Chatelaine v. Globe Construction Co.6 The opinion indicates that
the court considered it unnecessary to determine expressly
whether plaintiff's action was an action quanti minoris or one
for breach of a construction contract, although there is language
supporting the latter view. If plaintiff's action had been treated
as the former, the fact that the defendant was the manufacturer
would have permitted recovery beyond the mere cost of repairs
inasmuch as knowledge of the defects would have been presumed.
In Cardos v. Cristadoro and Radio Specialty Corporation6 the
court approved the specific enforcement of a contract obligating
the defendant to purchase at book value the stock of a fellow
deceased incorporator.
Lack of evidence to support the claims made resulted in the
3. 229 La. 664, 86 So.2d 526 (1956).
4. 229 La. 901, 87 So.2d 122 (1956).
5. 229 La. 280, 85 So.2d 515 (1956).
6. 228 La. 975, 84 So.2d 606 (1955).
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court's affirming judgments dismissing the suits in Sanders v.
WaltherT Allison v. Pick," and Kalshoven v. Loyola University.9
PARTICULAR CONTRACTS
J. Denson Smith*
SALE
It is well settled that the purchaser of a defective building is
entitled to recover from his vendor by way of the action qucnti
minoris what it will cost to remedy the defects. This principle
was applied in Cipriano v. Superior Realty & Construction Cor-
poration.' However, the defect was in a wall heater and the
award included not only what it would have cost to replace the
heater but also the cost of repairing the damage resulting from
a fire caused by the defect. At the same time the court refused
to permit recovery of damages for the loss of furniture damaged
by the fire. This was based on a lack of proof of knowledge of
the defect by the vendor, who was not the builder, and the ab-
sence of facts to support a finding of presumptive knowledge.
The holding draws a distinction between damage to the thing
sold resulting from an inherent defect and damage to the
vendee's other property. Such a distinction is proper in view of
the fact that the relief granted in an action quanti minoris is
founded on the theory of error as to the cause or determining
motive. The allowance of a reduction in price instead of redhibi-
tion rests on the supposition that the purchaser would have
bought the thing despite the defect although he would not have
paid as much as he did for it. Because of this basic theory, it is
clear that the action quanti minoris can afford no relief for the
destruction of furniture placed in the house by the vendee. It
might apply, presumably, so as to cover the replacement of furni-
ture in the case of a sale covering a house and furniture. But
this goes beyond the instant case. Plaintiff's claim against the
contractor who built the house was dismissed. The court pointed
out that the plaintiff was not attempting to avail himself of any
right his vendor may have had against the contractor under Ar-
7. 228 La. 1109, 85 So.2d 8 (1956).
8. 229 La. 524, 86 So.2d 179 (1956).
9. 229 La. 69, 85 So.2d 34 (1956).
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 228 La. 1065, 84 So.2d 822 (1955).
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